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LOGIC IN THE LAW 
H. L. A. HART, John Wisdom, Stephen Toulmin, and 0. C. Jensen 
are all professional philosophers who have been interested in the 
task of characterizing legal reasoning. As a lawyer who shares the 
belief that philosophers are peculiarly equipped to perform this task, 
it is my hope that the following pplemical remarks will further arouse 
such interest. 
In an essay on " Logic in the Law ", included in the recent collec- 
tion, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, the editor, Mr. A. G. Guest, 
joins the many lawyers and jurists who have exposed the persistent 
misuse of the concept of logic embodied in such phrases as 'tthe life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience', and 'some 
assume that the law is a logical code, whereas all must acknowledge 
that the law is not always logical at all'. Such phrases frequently 
appear as criticisms of reasoning in particular cases. Guest cites 
several examples, including the following: 
in the case of Whiteley v. Chappet, the accused was charged with 
having ' personated a person entitled to vote'. It was proved that 
he had filled in a voting paper in the name of a man who was dead. 
He was acquitted of the offense charged. This decision is frequently 
cited as a glaring example of ' automatic ' reasoning. The use of 
' dry logic ' is contrasted unfavourably with a judicial discretion based 
upon discovering the true intent of the legislature. But the issue in 
this case was simply one of the interpretation of the words ' personat- 
ing ' and ' entitled to vote '. It was, in fact, one of semantics (p. 180). 
Guest properly insists that the unsoundness of the foregoing 
decision should not be explained in terms of an " abuse of logic " 
Logical considerations apparently did not affect the choice of pre- 
mises, and the move from premises to conclusion was not logic- 
ally faulty. However, Guest's comments on the decision might, 
in either or both of two ways, mislead those interested in accurate 
characterization of the " logic " of legal reasoning. First, one should 
not interpret Guest's comments to mean that when a court's job 
is to decide the legal " interpretation of words ", no abuse of logic is 
possible. Under our system of law, judges are committed to the 
stare decisis principle that like cases are to be decided similarly, and 
most judicial opinions accordingly reflect this commitment, either 
explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, if an earlier case involving the 
same issue as the Whiteley case had been decided against the defend- 
ant, the decision in the latter case would have been inconsistent with 
the principle of stare decisis. "Inconsistent " does not exhaust the 
logician's meaning of " illogical ", but in as much as it is one signifi- 
cant criterion for the use of the latter concept, it is not inappropriate 
to say that " logical " considerations may affect the choice of legal 
premises, and, therefore, that an " abuse of logic " is possible in 
cases such as Whiteley v. Chappel. Secondly, should the routine, 
though very important, judicial task of deciding the legal meaning of 
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words be characterized as " one of semaiitics "? Such characteriza- 
tion suggests at least the possibility that issues of interpretation are 
to be resolved on the basis of linguistic usage. Though a " wooden 
literalness " does characterize the reasoning of some judicial decisions 
(e.g. the determination of the meaning of " person " in Whiteley v. 
Chappel), many lawyers and judges would agree that the legal meaning 
of concepts should be determined primarily on the basis of other 
factors such as the purposes of the rule or provision in which the 
concept appears, relevant social policies, and decisions in similar 
cases. 
Another objection to the use of logic in the law which Guest con- 
siders misconceived or unfounded is that logic is of little value to 
judges and lawyers, since they often arrive at their conclusions in- 
tuitively and thereafter formulate their reasoning (p. 187). 
An obvious criticism of this view and one which Guest does not 
state explicitly is that those psychological processes which are 
intuitive may be precisely the ones most in need of logical scrutiny. 
No good lawyer or judge relies on intuited conclusions. The next 
step is always to test these conclusions by examining the relevant 
authorities. At this stage, logical processes may be used, usually 
without identifying them as such, to expose inconsistencies and to 
test assumed logical relationships between legal propositions and 
authorities. 
One of Guest's criticisms of the view that there is no role for logic 
if the reasoner's psychological processes are largely intuitive, is that 
since some fields of law such as real property " are very largely 
devoid of any moral or social ideals ", there is not, in such fields, any 
" intuitive generalization to which resort can be made " (p. 187). 
Presumably Guest intends to suggest that in such fields some process 
of reasoning, as opposed to intuition, is required, and that as this 
process may be deductive in character, logic will, to that extent, be 
relevant. Here Guest appears to join those whom he is criticizing 
by erroneously assuming that the use of logic in the law depends on 
the character of the psychological processes which may be sub- 
jected to logical appraisal. That Guest assumes this is most odd, 
especially inasmuch as he recognizes that " there has to be a reasoned 
justification of the decision made " (p. 187). Guest's second criti- 
cism of those who see no role for logic where the relevant psycho- 
logical processes are intuitive, is in some respects similar to the 
aforestated criticism that such processes may be precisely the ones 
most in need of logical scrutiny. He states that: 
In his selection of competing propositions and in his consideration of 
the propriety of subsuming a particular case under a certain general 
rule, a judge is not, of course, guided by logic. He is guided by insight 
and experience. But in his application of the proposition selected, 
and in his testing of its implications before he adopts it, he uses a 
deductive form of reasoning in order to discover its potentialities. 
The directive force of a principle may be exercised along the line of 
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logical progression, and a judge must always keep in mind the effect 
which his decision will have on the general structure of the law (p. 188). 
Although some of the foregoing remarks are true, some are not, 
and some are otherwise puzzling. What, for example, is the 
difference, in a legal context, between " subsuming a particular 
case under a certain general rule ", and " application . . . [to a 
particular case] . . . of the 'proposition selected "? Moreover, 
is it true that " in his selection of competing propositions . . . a 
judge is not, of course, guided by logic " ? What does Guest mean 
by "guided by logic "? It has been demonstrated that logic, in a 
most common sense of that word, may play a significant role in the 
selection of premises relevant to the decision of particular cases. 
If judges committed to the stare decisis principle decline to decide 
in accordance therewith, their reasoning is, in that respect, illogical, 
though their decisions may be sound from other points of view. 
Guest's remarks here are all the more puzzling in view of the fact 
that at later points in his essay he states both that: 
In the dialectic of the law, logic has an important part to play at a 
stage when a suggested rule has to be tested in order to discover 
whether or not its adoption will involve the contradiction of already 
established legal principles (p. 195). 
and that : 
not [sic] can it ever be said that logic will help us to discover what 
propositions should be selected or what their true content should be 
(p. 197). 
It would be interesting to learn how Guest would reconcile these 
two statements. 
Guest objects to the assertion that the process of " drawing 
generalizations from the cases . . . involves the use of inductive 
logic " (p. 188). He identifies scientific reasoning with inductive 
reasoning and states that " the object of scientific inquiry is dis- 
covery; the object of a legal inquiry is decision " (p. 188). Hence, 
the judge should not be viewed as predicting that" he will decide one 
way or the other on the strength of his observations " (p. 189). 
As Guest's essay is entitled, " Logic in the Law ", he presumably 
does not wish to exclude from consideration the reasoning of lawyers 
who advise clients. Their job is often one of prediction, and though 
their work is in several ways dissimilar to the work of scientists, 
the analogy to induction is here much less inexact. The lawyer 
does often use " discovered " cases as bases for rejecting or adopting 
hypotheses as to what a judge is likely to decide. 
Guest puts the following hypothetical case: 
Let us take the words of a penal statute, in this case the Representa- 
tion of the People Act, 1949, s. 52: 'Any person shall be guilty of an 
offence if, at a parliamentary or local government election, he fraudu- 
lently takes out of the polling station any ballot paper.' Here the 
legal process consists in the application of a fixed and ascertained rule 
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to the facts of a particular case. The section of the statute con- 
stitutes the major premiss, the minor being 'X (the accused) at a 
parliamentary or local government election fraudulently took out of 
a polling station a ballot paper'. This, it will be seen, comprises the 
words of the indictment. If the minor premiss is true, the offence is 
made out and X will be found guilty. . . (p. 182). 
In the appellate courts . . ., counsel expect that the judges will be 
able (or unable) to apply the language of the major premiss to that of 
the minor, and to reach a conclusion. In the lower courts, however, 
the words of the statute may be quite simply and literally applied to 
the case in hand (p. 183). 
Guest then states that " It is this process of application which has 
been termed deductive, and we are concerned to inquire whether or 
not it is also logical " (p. 183). Guest's usage is odd, inasmuch as it 
suggests that reasoning may be deductive though not logical in 
character. Be that as it may, he suggests three " difficulties " in the 
way of describing such reasoning as logical. The first is that legal 
propositions are normative rather than fact-stating, and the general 
logic of norms has not yet been worked out. However, he concludes 
that this " difficulty " is not of major significance, " for it is a social 
fact that we do thus reason from the general norm to the particular 
instance " (p. 185). Guest appears to suggest, though this is not 
entirely clear, that there are two additional " difficulties " that stand 
in the way of classifying such reasoning as logical. These are that 
logical concepts have " no real existence in the world of nature ", 
and that careful inquiry must be made to determine whether such 
concepts are used in the same sense in premises and conclusion. 
Surely, these are not sound reasons for refusing to consider such 
reasoning as logical in character. What is suggested here is also 
true of the time-worn illustration of one type of syllogistic reasoning: 
" All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal." 
" Mortal " has no real existence in the world of nature. It is also 
important that " mortal " be used in the same sense in the premises 
and conclusion. 
Guest states that he agrees with the views of Professor John Wisdom 
expressed in the following passage drawn from his well-known essay, 
Gods ": 1 
In courts of law it sometimes happens that opposing counsel are 
agreed as to the facts and are not trying to settle a question of further 
fact, are not trying to settle whether the man who admittedly had 
quarrelled with the deceased did or did not murder him, but are con- 
cerned with whether Mr. A who admittedly handed his long-trusted 
clerk signed blank cheques did or did not exercise reasonable care, 
whether a ledger is or is not a document, whether a certain body was or 
was not a public authority. 
In such cases we notice that the process of argument is not a chain 
of demonstrative . . . [deductive] . . . reasoning. It is a present- 
ing and representing of those features of the case which severally 
1 In Logic and Language, ed. by A. G. N. Flew, pp. 187-206. 
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co-operate in favour of the conclusion, in favour of saying what the 
reasoner wishes said, in favour of calling the situation by the name by 
which he wishes to call it. The reasons are like the legs of a chair, not 
the links of a chain (p. 195, Flew volume). 
It is useful to distinguish between reasoning used to establish 
relevant premises (legs of the chair) for legal conclusions and the 
processes of reasoning from such premises to such conclusions. At 
least with respect to the process -of establishing the " legs ", it has 
been demonstrated that deductive logic may be used. Professor 
Wisdom's analysis is, however, peculiarly insightful insofar as it 
emphasizes the multi-factored character of much legal reasoning, 
and implicitly recognizes that the logical relationship between these 
factors and the conclusions they support should not be forced into a 
deductive mould. 
Guest also aligns himself with the principal theses of E. H. Levi 
embodied in his book: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Guest 
is principally interested in Levi's insight that since much legal 
reasoning is analogical, the form of such reasoning may therefore be 
described in Aristotle's terms as " neither like reasoning from part 
to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning 
from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to the same 
term, and one of them is known " (p. 190). Guest quotes Levi's 
view that: 
The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different 
cases as though they were the same ? A working legal system must 
. . .be willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from them 
to the justice of applying a common classification. The existence of 
some facts in common brings into play the general rule (p. 191). 
This way of putting " the problem " is especially relevant in those 
fields of law in which case authority is plentiful and stare decisis 
important. 
To conclude, neither Guest's analysis nor mine examines all of 
the problems of characterizing legal reasoning. Although it would 
be rash for either of us to claim finality for our analyses, it may not 
be rash to hope that these will ignite some flickers of interest among 
those best qualified to judge. 
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